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Abstract 
Microcredit has been shown to be effective in reducing poverty in many developing countries. 
However, less is known about its effect on human capital formation. In this paper, we develop a model 
examining the relation between microcredit and child labour. We then empirically examine the impact 
of access to microcredit on children‘s education and child labour using a new and large data set from 
rural Bangladesh. We address the selection bias using the instrumental variable method where the 
instrument relies on an exogenous variation in treatment intensity among households in different 
villages. The results show that household participation in a microcredit program may increase child 
labour and reduce school enrolment. The adverse effects are more pronounced for girls than boys.  
Younger children are more adversely affected than their older siblings and the children of poorer and 
less educated households are affected most adversely. Our findings remain robust to different 
specifications and methods, and when corrected for various sources of selection bias.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Microcredit programs have expanded rapidly in recent decades in the developing world. It has 
reached more than 20 million borrowers in Bangladesh, which accounts for about 60 percent 
of the country‘s poor rural households (World Bank 2006). The United Nations (UN) declared 
2005 as the International Year of Microcredit, and urged multilateral donor agencies and 
developed countries to support the microfinance movement to achieve its Millennium 
Development Goal of halving poverty by 2015. International donors, lending agencies, 
national governments are now allocating tens of millions of dollars for microcredit programs 
each year. There has been renewed pledge from policy makers and practitioners to expand 
such programs and to increase their outreach to reduce poverty.  The success and popularity of 
microcredit over the past decades are evidenced by the fact that there are more than 7000 
microfinance institutions today, serving millions of poor people, and that microcredit has 
proved to be an important instrument in helping ―large population groups find ways in which 
to break out of poverty‖ (The Norwegian Nobel Committee‘s press release in awarding the 
Nobel Peace Prize for 2006 to Grameen Bank and its founder Muhammad Yunus.). 
 
If access to microcredit helps reduce poverty, then one might surmise that it could also 
improve investment in children‘s education.  This is because underdeveloped credit markets 
coupled with low household income (Ranjan 1999; Baland and Robinson 2000; Doepke and 
Zilibotti 2005) or lack of access to credit are often considered major factors responsible for 
inadequate education for children in developing countries (Jacoby and Skoufias 1997; Ranjan 
2001; Dehejia and Gatti 2005; Edmonds 2006).  Access to credit can have a positive effect on 
children‘s education through a number of channels.  First, to the extent that credit may 
increase the borrower‘s income, the income effect may positively affect the demand for 
children‘s schooling (Behrman and Knowles 1999). Second, the vulnerability of rural 
households to adverse exogenous shocks may force them to pull their children out of school in 
times of need, hampering sustained school enrolment for their children. Loans from 
microcredit organizations (MOs) can assist consumption smoothing (Pitt and Khandker 1998; 
Khandker 2005; Islam 2007), thereby reducing the likelihood that children are withdrawn 
from school in response to adverse shocks.  Third, several studies have demonstrated that 
women have stronger preferences than men for their children‘s education (Pitt and Khandker 
1998; Behrman and Rosenzweig 2002). Since women are the dominant group of borrowers 
from MOs, microcredit may positively affect children‘s schooling through empowering 
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women. These preferences toward schooling may also be influenced by mandatory adult 
training programs conducted by MOs. Though MOs in general do not have any direct declared 
objective of improving children‘s education, they do educate members about the potential 
benefits of sending children to school. For example, Grameen Bank members need to 
memorize sixteen decisions, one of which is, ‗we shall educate our children‘.  
 
On the other hand, microcredit may also have unintended consequences on children‘s 
education for several reasons.  First, microcredit loans often require establishment of 
household enterprise, which requires extra labour to work in it.  For example, if a household 
uses microcredit loans to purchase livestock, it will require labour to take care of the animals, 
which can increase the demand for child labour. Second, the amount of loan is not large 
enough to hire external labour, which may compel the household to resort to child labour.
1
  
Third, the loan repayment period is short and interest rate is high, making the household 
myopic, which may induce parents to heavily discount the future return on their children‘s 
education.
2
 In order to service the loan, it may be necessary to supplement household income, 
at least temporarily, with the proceeds from child labour. Therefore, the additional activities 
made possible by access to microcredit and the factors related to servicing the terms of 
microcredit loan may adversely affect children‘s education. Children may need to be 
employed directly in the newly created or expanded household enterprises, or as carer for their 
siblings, or in farm and livestock duties and other household chores. 
 
While various empirical studies have found that microcredit can increase the household‘s 
income and consumption (Pitt and Khandker 1998; Kaboski and Townsend 2005; Islam 2007; 
Karlan and Zinman 2008a), there is less evidence on the impact of microcredit on human 
capital formation, and the limited evidence that exists is far less conclusive than the effect of 
microcredit on alleviating poverty.  One strand of empirical studies reports that access to 
credit can help reduce child labour and increase schooling in developing countries.
3
 For 
example, Jacoby (1994) finds that unequal access to credit is an important source of inequality 
                                                 
1 Loan size varies but is typically between US$40 to $150. However, members may take larger loans after repaying 
their first loan. Loans are made for any profitable and socially acceptable income generating activities such as 
poultry, livestock, sericulture, fisheries, rural trading, rural transport, paddy husking, food processing, small shops 
and restaurants. 
2 Typical interest rates on microcredit loan are above 30% on a reducing-balance basis and most MOs require that 
households start repaying the loans four weeks after obtaining credit. The effective interest rates are even higher 
because of commissions and fees charged by microcredit organizations. The frequency of repayments, and the 
systems adopted to collect repayments also raise the effective interest rates. 
3 See Belly and Lochner (2007) for the empirical literature on borrowing constraints and schooling in the context of 
developed countries.  
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in schooling investment in Peru. Dehejia and Gatti (2005) find a negative association between 
child labour and access to credit across various countries. Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) observe 
that, in India, the incidence of child labour increases as access to credit becomes more 
difficult.
4
  The second strand of literature finds ambiguous results.  Wydick (1999) reports that 
the relation between access to microcredit and children‘s schooling is not unambiguously 
positive in the case of Guatemala.  He finds that a child is more likely to work in a household 
enterprise when the household borrowing is used for capital equipment instead of working 
capital. A similar conclusion is drawn in Maldonaldo and Gonzalez-Vega (2008), who find 
that households demand more child labour if they cultivate land and operate labour-intensive 
microenterprises. Based on microcredit programs in Bangladesh, Pitt and Khandker (1998) 
find that girls‘ schooling is positively affected when women borrow from Grameen but not so 
when they borrow from other microcredit programs. Finally, Yamauchi (2007) finds that 
investment in household enterprise may not necessarily eliminate child labour or promote 
children‘s education in rural Indonesia while Hazarika and Sarangi (2008) report that, in rural 
Malawi, children tend to work more in households that have access to microcredit. 
 
Given the limited and conflicting evidence summarized above, the purpose of this paper is to 
examine the impact of household participation in microcredit programs on both children‘s 
schooling and child labour using a new, large, nationally representative and unique data set 
constructed from various microcredit programs in Bangladesh.  Our results show that 
participation in microcredit programs adversely affects children‘s schooling and exacerbates 
the problem of child labour. The results overwhelmingly indicate that girls are more likely to 
be affected adversely, although the effect on boys is ambiguous.  It is also shown that younger 
children, who are more exposed to the program, are more likely to be put to work and less 
likely to attend school as their parents take out microcredit.   
 
We also estimate the treatment effect by gender of participants, by household income proxied 
by the level of education obtained by parents, and by household land ownership.  Although 
the adverse effect does not differ much whether credit is obtained by women or men, we find 
some evidence for gender preferences: the adverse effect on girls‘ schooling tends to be 
smaller when credit is obtained by mother than when it is obtained by father.   The adverse 
effect decreases in household income and asset ownership, implying that children of poorer 
households are more likely to be caught in a vicious poverty cycle.  Our empirical findings 
                                                 
4 Similar results are reported in Beglee, Dehejia and Gatti (2005) for Tanzania, and in Edmonds (2006) for South 
Africa. 
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remain robust to different specifications and methods, and when corrected for various sources 
of selection bias.   
 
The adverse effect of microcredit on children‘s schooling and child labour is likely to be due 
to several specific aspects of microcredit loans discussed earlier. Indeed we also find evidence 
showing that participation in microcredit programs increases the likelihood that children are 
taken out of school to work for their parents in household enterprises set up with microcredit.  
Overall our results suggest that care needs to be taken in assessing the effectiveness of 
microcredit programs.  On one hand, successful microcredit programs can alleviate poverty 
and contribute to rural economy.  On the other hand, they can alter parents‘ incentives in a 
way that adversely affects children‘s schooling, which could exacerbate poverty in the longer 
term. In addition, the adverse effect that falls unequally on girls would reduce the 
effectiveness of policies to promote gender equality in education in developing countries.   In 
sum, microcredit programs need to be complemented by other policies to tackle the multiple 
goals of poverty reduction, human capital formation, and social development.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a simple theoretical model 
examining the relation between microcredit and child labour and shows that access to 
microcredit can result in increased child labour if the credit cannot be used to hire external 
labour and the required returns on investment are high.  Section 3 describes our data and 
presents descriptive statistics.  Section 4 discusses issues related to our empirical methodology 
while Section 5 reports the main empirical findings.  Section 6 provides the results from 
additional robustness check.  Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. A Model of Microcredit and Child Labour 
 
Child labour contributes to the household‘s current consumption at the cost of reduced 
consumption for children in the future.  Therefore, if the household‘s current consumption is 
too low (and marginal utility too high) relative to discounted marginal utility of children‘s 
future consumption and the household is unable to borrow against future earnings to increase 
its current consumption, then the household would resort to child labour to increase current 
consumption.  The corollary is that children‘s education will benefit if the household can 
increase its current consumption without resorting to child labour.  In this section, we present 
a simple model to understand whether microcredit offers such opportunities.  
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Our basic model follows Baland and Robinson (2000).  A household consists of parents and a 
child.  Parents live for two periods indexed by 2,1t . In each period, parents have a unit of 
time endowment, which can be supplied inelastically to market activities or used in the 
household enterprise.  Parents‘ time endowment is worth 1e  efficiency units of labour.  At 
,1t  the child also has a unit of time endowment.  Parents decide how to allocate the child‘s 
time between child labour and human capital accumulation.  If cl is the fraction of child‘s time 
that is allocated to work, then cl1  is the fraction allocated to schooling, and the child‘s 
human capital at 2t  measured in efficiency units of labour is )1( clh   where h  is twice-
differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave with 1)0( h .  The labour market is 
assumed competitive in each period, and wage per efficiency unit of labour is normalized to 
one.  Parental utility function takes the form 
 
),()()())(,,( 2121 cc cwcucucwccU                       (1) 
 
where tc is the household‘s consumption at 2,1t , cc is child‘s consumption at 2t , and 
both u and w are twice-differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave. In the above, 
)1,0(  is a discount factor for the household‘s second-period consumption and )1,0(  
is a parameter measuring the extent to which parents are altruistic to their child.
5
  Unlike 
Baland and Robinson, we do not consider the possibility of parents‘ savings or bequests since 
the low level of current consumption is the main reason for child labour. 
 
We first look at the case where the household does not have access to microcredit and is 
unable to establish a household enterprise.  In this case, parents‘ entire time endowment and 
                                                 
5 In Baland and Robinson (2000), the parental utility function has the same form in both periods and there is no 
discounting.  Because child labour contributes to parents‘ income only in the first period, parents‘ first-period 
consumption is larger than their second-period consumption if bequests are non-negative and savings are zero.  
Since the parental utility function is strictly increasing and concave, this implies that, with zero savings, the 
marginal utility from the first-period consumption is less than the marginal utility from the second-period 
consumption.  Thus it follows that zero savings can never be optimal for parents: if savings are set equal to zero for 
some reason (although it cannot be optimal as argued above), then the marginal utility from the first-period 
consumption is less than that from the second-period consumption so that the laissez-faire level of child labour is 
actually below the efficient level, contrary to Baland and Robinson‘s Proposition 3 (p. 670).  A simple way to 
rectify the problem is either to assign different parental utility functions in the two periods or to introduce 
discounting.  We choose the second option. 
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part of child‘s time are devoted to market activities.6  Denoting child labour by cl , 
consumption in each period is clec 1 , ec 2 , and )1( cc lhc  .  The household‘s 
problem is to choose cl  to maximize the objective function in (1) subject to constraint, 
]1,0[cl .  Denote the solution by 
*
cl  and use the asterisk for optimal consumption in each 
period.  Following Baland and Robinson, we focus on an interior optimum )1,0(* cl , of 
which the first-order condition is  
 
0)1(')(')(': ***1
*  ccc lhcwcul  .                                     (2) 
 
Next we move to the case where the household can choose to participate in the microcredit 
program. As discussed previously, credit is typically used for capital expenditure necessary to 
establish a household enterprise for quick generation of additional income.  Running the 
household enterprise requires labour and, not being able to hire external labour, the household 
needs to reallocate its labour between market activities and the household enterprise.     
 
To simplify matters, we assume that the household enterprise generates income only in the 
first period.  Since child labour is relevant only in the first period, this simplification is at no 
loss of generality.  The income from the household enterprise is given by ),( lk  where k is 
the amount of credit to be paid back at 2t  at interest rate  , l  is the amount of labour put 
into the household enterprise, and   is twice-differentiable, strictly increasing in both 
arguments, and strictly concave with 0),( lk  if 0or0  lk . Since we rule out 
employment of external labour, we have chah lell   where ahl  is the amount of adult labour 
and chl is the amount of child labour employed in the household enterprise.  Denote the 
amount of adult labour in market activities by aml  and the amount of child labour in market 
activities by cml . Then we must have 1 aham ll  and 1 chcm ll .  With the household 
enterprise, consumption in each period is ])1(,[1 chamcmam lleklelc   , 
kec )1(2  , and )1( chcmc llhc  .       
 
                                                 
6
 Since households eligible for microcredit typically own a small piece of land (less than half an acre), it is 
reasonable to assume that household labour is mostly devoted to market activities, rather than to family farm. 
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The household‘s problem is now to choose ),,,( klll chcmam  to maximize the objective 
function in (1) subject to constraints, ],1,0[aml ,0,0  chcm ll ,1 chcm ll 0k .  To 
make the comparison with the case without household enterprise meaningful, we focus on the 
interior optimum for child labour, which will be true if, for example,   is not too small. Thus 
the constraint 1 chcm ll is slack.  Denoting the solution by )
ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ( klll chcmam  and the second 
partial derivative of   evaluated at the solution by l , the first-order conditions with respect 
to labour variables are given by 
 
                









,1ˆif0
),1,0(ˆif0
,0ˆif0
)ˆ(')1(:ˆ 1
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am
am
lam
l
l
l
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l
l
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


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
).1,0(ˆif0
,0ˆif0
)ˆˆ1(')ˆ(')ˆ(':ˆ 1
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l
l
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Needless to say, participation in the microcredit program should be individually rational for 
the household.  That is, the household should be better off with microcredit than without it if it 
decided to participate in the program.  It is then easy to see that a necessary condition for 
beneficial microcredit is 1l , or the marginal return on labour from the household 
enterprise should be larger than that from market activities.  To see this, suppose 1l .  
Then from (3), we have 1ˆ aml , or entire adult labour should be in market activities. Also 
from (4) and (5), we have chcm lUlU  // .  Thus if optimal child labour in market 
activities is positive, then child labour in the household enterprise should be zero.   In sum, 
if 1l , then the solution to the household‘s problem is the same as the one in the absence of 
microcredit.  Thus in what follows, we focus on the case 1l .  In this case, we have 
0ˆ aml and, from (4) and (5) again, child labour should necessarily be employed only in the 
household enterprise.  At the interior solution, the first-order condition (5) holds with equality: 
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0)ˆ1(')ˆ(')ˆ(')ˆˆ1(')ˆ(')ˆ(':ˆ 11  chclchcmclch lhcwcullhcwcul  .   (6) 
 
We now turn to our main question of how microcredit affects the extent of child labour.  Let 
us first observe that if the household decides to participate in the microcredit program, its 
utility should be at least as large as when it does not participate. Since participation in 
microcredit reduces the household‘s second-period consumption, it should necessarily be that 
either the first-period consumption increases or the child‘s second-period consumption 
increases, the latter being equivalent to reduced child labour.  Otherwise, the household can 
always return to the situation without microcredit.  Rearranging (2) and (6) leads us to 
 
           ).(')ˆ(')]1('')ˆ1(''[ *11
* cuculhwlhw lcch                   (7) 
 
Since w  and h  are strictly concave, it follows from (7) that 
*ˆ
cch ll   or child labour increases 
with microcredit if and only if )ˆ('/)(' 1
*
1 cucul  .   Note also that )ˆ('/)(' 1
*
1 cucul   is 
consistent with 1l , a necessary condition for beneficial microcredit.  This is because, when 
child labour increases, the only way the household can benefit from microcredit is to increase 
the first-period consumption (
*
11ˆ cc  ), from which 1)ˆ('/)(' 1
*
1 cucu  follows since u  is 
strictly concave.  The above condition has a ready interpretation: beneficial microcredit 
increases child labour if the marginal return on labour from the household enterprise is 
sufficiently large.  In this case, parents divert more child labour to the household enterprise 
than when they did not have access to microcredit. Needless to say, child labour need not 
increase in this case if parents can hire external labour at market wage of one.  On the other 
hand, if )ˆ('/)('1 1
*
1 cucul  , then microcredit can actually reduce child labour.  As this 
case shows, inability to hire external labour alone is not sufficient for an increase in child 
labour; if the return on child labour from the household enterprise is not sufficiently large 
relative to the return on schooling, then parents would continue to send their children to 
school.  However, since repayment of the loan typically requires high returns on investment, 
one could argue that the case of )ˆ('/)(' 1
*
1 cucul   is more likely.  In sum, access to 
microcredit can result in increased child labour if the credit cannot be used to hire external 
labour and the required returns on investment are high.   
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3. The Program, Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
3.1. Background: Schooling and Child Labour in Bangladesh  
Bangladesh has achieved rapid progress in child schooling in recent years. The gross primary 
enrolment rate increased from 72 percent in 1990 to 96 percent in 2000. This has been made 
possible due to government‘s various stipend programs for children in primary and secondary 
schools in all rural areas of Bangladesh. However, the Bangladesh Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey 2000 reports the net primary enrolment rate of only 65.4 percent and the 
primary school completion rate of 66.3 percent in 2000.
7
  The Bangladesh Child Labour 
Survey 2002-03 estimates that 6.4 million children aged 5-17 work in rural areas compared to 
1.5 million in urban areas. Most of the child labour is in agriculture. Nearly 50 percent of 
primary school students drop out before they complete grade five. Among the poorest quintile 
of households, the share of family income contributed by child labourers reaches nearly 50 
percent (Salmon, 2005). Child labourers aged 5-14 constitute about 12 percent of the 
country‘s labour force (Rahman et al. 1999) of which 73.5 percent are boys and 26.5 percent 
are girls.  
 
Despite the persistence of child labour, considerable progress has been made in increasing 
equitable access, reducing dropout rates and implementing quality enhancement measures in 
primary education. Access to primary education has increased steadily over the past two 
decades. A compulsory primary education law was adopted in 1990, and the compulsory 
primary education program was extended nationwide in 1993 although the law is not strictly 
enforced. Incentives to attend primary school have been introduced with the distribution of 
textbooks and provision of "food for education"—the latter was converted to a cash stipend in 
2002. Primary education in rural areas is provided through government schools, madrasas 
(Islamic schools)
 
and NGO-run non-formal primary schools.  
 
3.2. The Program and Data 
The data were collected by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) on behalf 
of the Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PKSF) (Rural Employment Support Foundation) 
                                                 
7
 Gross primary school enrolment rate is the total number of pupils enrolled in primary school, regardless of age, 
expressed as a percentage of the population in the theoretical age group for primary education. Net primary school 
enrolment rate is the total number of pupils in the theoretical age group for primary education who are actually 
enrolled in primary school expressed as a percentage of the total population in that age group. 
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with support from the World Bank.
8
 This survey is the largest and the most comprehensive of 
the existing microcredit programs in Bangladesh. Its geographic coverage is spread evenly 
across Bangladesh, and the sub-district (thana) level comparisons reveal that selected sub-
districts are not different from the average (Zohir et al. 2001). The data cover 13 MOs of 
different sizes in terms of operations and membership.
 
These MOs were selected to constitute 
a nationally representative data set for the entire microcredit program in Bangladesh. The 
most notable MOs studied in this paper are ASA and Proshikha, the third and fourth largest 
MOs, respectively, in Bangladesh. All 13 MOs follow the Grameen Bank-style lending 
procedure and typically give access to microcredit to households owning less than a half-acre 
of land. 
 
The survey includes 13 districts covering 91 villages spread over 23 sub-districts in 
Bangladesh. A census of all households in the 91 villages was conducted before the survey 
was administered in early 1998. The actual targeting of survey households involves two 
stages: (1) the selection of the villages where MOs operate; (2) the selection of treated 
households within the selected villages. The non-participants from the program villages who 
are observationally similar were also selected as the control group. Participation in a credit 
program was defined in terms of current membership reported during the census. From the 
village census lists of households, 34 households were drawn from each program and non-
program village. Because the census found a large number of ineligible households in 
program villages, the sample was drawn to maintain the proportion of eligible and ineligible 
households of about 12:5. The sample size within program and control villages was also 
determined accordingly. 
 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
The original survey consists of 3026 households. In this paper, we consider the subset of 2034 
households who have at least one child aged 7-16 at the time of the survey. This represents a 
total of 4277 children of which 2658 belong to treatment households and the remainder to the 
control group. Our sample contains both male and female borrowers but the former account 
for only 12 percent of all borrowers (and 133 households) representing 281 children.  Among 
all children, 54.2 percent are boys. 
 
                                                 
8 The PKSF is the apex organization for microfinance. The microlending community regards it as a regulatory 
agency, and it exercises authority over the MOs.  
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The household level questionnaire includes primary and secondary activity of each child. We 
define ―child labourer‖ as anyone aged 7-16 who performs any economic activity (i.e., if a 
parent answers ‗employed‘, ‗household work‘, or ‗employed but not working‘). A child is 
considered to be in school if he/she is currently enrolled in school and attended school in the 
last month of the survey period.  By this definition 77.4 percent of girls aged 7-16 in the 
sample were classified as being in school and 10.4 percent in work. The corresponding figures 
for boys are 71.3 percent and 15.7 percent, respectively. Other children are reported to be 
neither working nor in school, and possibly many of them are helping parents with household 
work. So there may well be under-reporting of child labour.
9
 The results by participation 
status are reported in Table 1. School enrolment is lower and child labour higher among 
children of the treatment group. We find a statistically significant difference in school 
enrolment and child labour between boys of treated and untreated households, but no such 
difference exists for girls. However, the difference in school enrolment between girls and boys 
is larger in the treatment group. 
 
--- Table 1 goes about here. --- 
 
Figure 1 plots school enrolment of children by age for both sex groups. Children at high-
school age (12-16 years old) are less likely to be enrolled in school because of drop-outs.  At 
primary-school age, the proportion of children aged 7-8 enrolled in school is lower than their 
older counterpart (9-11 years old), indicating that there are a considerable number of children 
who start schooling at a later age. The difference between treatment and control groups in 
school enrolment is larger for boys. Girls aged 7-11 have a similar rate of enrolment in both 
treatment and control groups, but after age 13, girls in the control group tend to have a lower 
enrolment rate.  On average, children at primary-school age have a higher enrolment rate 
compared to their older siblings, the latter more likely to drop out from school and go to work. 
Overall, a higher proportion of children from treated households are in work (Figure 2). 
 
--- Figures 1 and 2 go about here. --- 
 
Table 1 also provides other descriptive statistics for child and household demographics and 
village characteristics. It shows that the average age of children is 11.5 years for both groups 
                                                 
9 In our sample, only one percent of children are reported to be both in school and in work, so we ignore these 
cases. It is usual in rural areas of Bangladesh that parents arrange a modest amount of part-time work for their 
children while still keeping them at school (see, for example, Ravallion and Woodon 2000). 
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of households.  There is no difference between treatment and control groups in the gender 
composition of children. The treated group has slightly more members in the household than 
the non-treated group. For each household in the survey, there is an average of four children 
below 18 years of age. Non-treated households tend to be better educated, a little older but 
smaller in household size. Descriptive statistics not reported in Table 1 shows that a total of 
about one quarter of mothers did not go to school at all. More than a quarter of our sample has 
a secondary school in their locality, and primary schools exist in most of the villages. 
Compared to program villages, control villages are more likely to have primary and secondary 
schools, telephone office and local government (UP) offices. On the other hand, program 
villages have superior health facilities and are located relatively closer to the nearest sub-
district.  However, most of these differences are not statistically significant at the conventional 
level. Thus we do not think that the differences between the program and control villages 
render the possibility of non-random program placement an issue of concern.  Nonetheless, 
we control these characteristics plus a wide variety of village-level variables in our regression 
to take into account of possibility of non-random program placement at the village level. 
 
4. Empirical Methodology 
 
In estimating the impact of microcredit on children‘s school enrolment and child labour, we 
follow a standard methodology (Wydick 1999; Ravallion and Wodon 2000; Edmonds 2006). 
Let Si be a binary variable that denotes whether child i (i) works (Si =1) or not (Si =0) and (ii) 
attends school (Si =1) or not (Si=0). We estimate the impact of participation in microcredit 
programs on children‘s schooling/work with the following equation: 
 
(8)                                                                  3210 ijkljklklijkllijkl εCreditβZβXβ S    
 
where the subscripts index child (i), household (j), village (k), and district (l).  X  is a vector of 
child- and household-specific covariates, and Z is a vector of village-specific covariates.  β0l 
captures fixed effects. ‗Credit‘ is a continuous treatment variable defined by the amount of 
microcredit borrowed by the household. It is equal to zero if a household did not participate in 
a microcredit program. The error term εijkl is assumed to be i.i.d. Using equation (8) we can 
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use the probit model to estimate the probabilities of child labour or school enrolment 
attributable to participation in microcredit programs.
10
  
 
Estimating equation (8) directly is problematic, however.  First, programs may be placed in 
specific villages and hence program placement may not be random. Selection for placement 
could be influenced by biases in favour of high-income villages – because they may have 
higher participation rates – or by official bias in favour of poorer villages. However, given 
that programs are placed by central decision and that there are hundreds of MOs, it is 
reasonable to assume that village level program placement is a problem of ―selection-on-
observables‖. The survey covers a wide range of village level variables. So we can account for 
the non-random program placement by a set of control variables at the village level, which are 
included in the vector Z. We also use district level fixed effects to remove any unobserved 
heterogeneity across different geographical areas. Since we have 13 MOs, each from a 
different district, this fixed effect also captures the differences between the MOs. Thus, we 
tackle the potential problem of non-random program placement using both geographical and 
MO-level fixed effects and village-level observed covariates.
11
 It is to be noted that we adopt 
an estimation strategy different from that used by Pitt and Khandker (1998). We do not use 
village fixed effects.  Rather we use village-level pre-program characteristics to control non-
random program placement. Village fixed effects could give us biased results if the programs 
are placed based on certain shocks (e.g, floods) at the village level. We control any 
unobserved heterogeneity using geographical (district level) and MO-level fixed effects.
12
 
 
Second, households self-select into the program but not all of them are able to obtain 
microcredit. Generally only eligible poor households receive microcredit, the eligibility being 
typically determined based on the amount of land-holding. However, other factors that 
influence whether a household has access to microcredit could also affect outcomes for 
                                                 
10 It is possible to use a bivariate probit model to estimate child labour and schooling simultaneously. However, the 
number of children who are both in school and in work or who do neither is very small in our sample. Thus the 
work versus schooling is nearly a dichotomous decision and therefore we do not adopt a bivariate probit model.  
11 Probit estimates with fixed effects give rise to inconsistent coefficients of the fixed effects. However, when the 
number of observations per fixed effect is at least 8, we can consistently estimate the fixed effects (Heckman 
1981). We have at least 250 observations per district and so the model is consistently estimated. For the same 
reason, we do not estimate parental fixed effects which can eliminate unobserved time-invariant household-level 
variables or permanent heterogeneity. Instead we consider clustering at the household level. 
12 Fixed effects would eliminate village-level omitted characteristics, but differences in initial conditions also 
matter for program placement. See Keane and Wolpin (2002) for a similar analogy for problems using state-level 
fixed effects to estimate the welfare impacts in the US, and the resulting bias in the estimates. See also Morduch 
(1999) for pitfalls using village fixed effects in Pitt and Khandker (1998). However, our qualitative conclusion is 
not affected even if we use village fixed effects or separate fixed effects for target and non-target populations in 
each village. Using different fixed effects only changes the size, not the sign, of the coefficient estimates. 
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children of that household. One such factor could be household income or wealth. For 
example, MOs may be more willing to provide credit to households that operate non-farm 
enterprises because the use of credit is less fungible in such households. Microcredit loans 
often require that family enterprises be established because they provide less opportunity for 
misuse of the loan. Poor households that operate an enterprise are also more likely to employ 
their children in that enterprise, and thus less likely to send them to school. Such negative 
correlation between credit access and schooling introduces a conservative bias in the 
coefficients. Thus we need to consider the endogeneity of participation in microcredit 
programs at the household level. The endogeneity problem implies that selection into 
treatment is on the basis of unobserved characteristics εijkl in equation (8). This implies 
potential non-zero correlation between εijkl and Creditjk. Consequently, impact estimates that 
use a simple probit/linear probability model (LPM) may not reflect the program‘s causal 
effect on children‘s school enrolment or child labour. 
 
To account for self-selection into the program, we consider a source of exogenous variation. 
The MOs set the eligibility criteria for participating in the program. A household is eligible if 
it does not own more than a half-acre of land. The land ownership criterion is mainly used as a 
targeting mechanism to identify the poor. Since poverty does not exclusively depend on land 
ownership, however, the administrator, local loan officer or branch manager sometimes take 
into account other socio-economic conditions of a household. Consequently there are some 
ineligible households that receive microcredit. Although these households are a distinct 
minority (70 percent of the treatment group in our sample is eligible), the participation in the 
program based on eligibility is probabilistic since the program eligibility criterion is not 
strictly followed. Thus our approach in estimating the treatment effect is similar to the use of 
fuzzy regression discontinuity design (see Van der Klaauw 2002), which we implement using 
an IV approach.   
 
It is clear that a household is more likely to receive microcredit when a microcredit program is 
already available in a village.  Therefore as an instrument for the actual receipt of microcredit, 
we may consider the eligibility status interacted with an indicator for presence of program in a 
given village.
13
 Instead of using this instrument directly, however, we utilize an unexploited 
                                                 
13 Pitt and Khandker (1998) and Islam (2007) use this instrument for participation in a credit program in 
Bangladesh, and discuss the plausibility of this instrument in detail.  Morduch (1998) questions the validity of 
using this instrument, but in response to Morduch‘s critique, Pitt (1999) argues at length that the eligibility criterion 
satisfies the conditional exogeneity and exclusion restriction. 
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exogenous source of variation in the treatment intensity based on a household‘s exposure to 
the program in different villages. As shown in Figure 3, treated households in different 
villages appear to borrow different amounts.  Intensity of treatment varies widely in different 
villages, depending on how long a microcredit program has been available in the village.  In 
our sample, the earliest a program was made available in a village was 1980 and the latest a 
program became available in another village was 1997. As shown in Figure 3, the amount of 
credit a household borrows largely depends on how long the program has been available in the 
village.  So we use the instrument, I = Mk × Ej × Nk where Mk  is a binary variable that equals 
1 if village k has a microcredit program, Ej is a binary variable that equals 1 if household j is 
eligible (i.e., owns less than half-acre of land), and Nk is the number of years a microcredit 
program has been available in village k.
14
 With controls for village and fixed effects, 
identification requires that there be no contemporaneous village-level unobservables that are 
correlated with program placement and child labour/schooling. The equation for the demand 
for credit then assumes the form: 
 
(9)                                                     2210  ξZαXα)NE(MαCredit jklkjkkjkjkljkl   
 
where X now includes only household-specific covariates since participation in microcredit 
programs is determined at the household level.  
 
--- Figure 3 goes about here. --- 
 
The probit estimates are obtained using the two-stage procedure where the second-stage 
regression uses the value of credit from the first-stage credit demand equation (9), which is 
estimated by a standard Tobit model. The use of estimated variable (instrumented credit) in a 
non-linear specification may lead to bias but this bias is of second order and thus very small 
(Train et al. 1987). We also estimate the second stage using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimations of LPM. Additionally, because of the non-random nature of our sample we use 
inverse-propensity score weights in the standard fashion for all the estimators (Hirano, Imbens 
and Rider 2003). This involves attaching an estimated weight to each observation in one 
sample that corresponds to the probability of observing a similar observation in the other 
                                                 
14
 We also used Mk × Ej  only as an instrument and obtained qualitatively similar results. We also experimented 
with instruments that include separate dummies for year of microfinance placement in villages. Again the results 
turn out to be similar. 
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sample. With normalization, we attach a weight of one to each treated household, and to each 
comparison group member a weight of p/(1-p), where p is the estimated propensity score.
15
   
 
A potential problem with interpreting these results when using credit as the treatment variable 
is that the reported amount of credit is subject to misreporting or other types of measurement 
error since households may forget or not report the amount correctly.
16
 This measurement 
error is likely to impart attenuation bias to the estimated coefficients. However, we do not 
think the problem of measurement error is serious in our case since we are using instrumented 
credit variable as the treatment variable. Nonetheless, we also use a binary treatment indicator, 
i.e., whether or not a household is currently a member of a microcredit program or not, which 
is unlikely to be measured or reported with error. It can also serve as a robustness check of our 
main results.  It should be noted, however, that the use of binary treatment indicator raises 
another issue as dummy endogenous regressors with limited dependent variables raise some 
econometric problems. Angrist (2001) advocates using simple IV estimators as an alternative 
because they require weaker assumptions and are often sufficient to answer questions of 
interest in empirical studies.  We therefore estimate the treatment effect also by using a LPM 
in the second stage of the IV regression.
17
 
 
To adjust for clustering at the village level we first use the cluster-correlated Huber-White 
covariance matrix estimator. Donald and Lang (2007) have pointed out that asymptotic 
justification of this estimator requires a large number of aggregate units. Monte Carlo 
simulations (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2004) suggest that, when the number of 
primary sampling units (PSUs) is less than 50, this estimator performs poorly, leading to 
excessive rejection of the null hypothesis of no effect. Fortunately, with 91 PSUs in our 
sample we can potentially overcome the problem by using cluster-consistent standard errors. 
The cluster-adjustment works well for binary outcomes and nonlinear models such as logit 
and probit models, provided that the number of clusters is large (Angrist and Lavy 2002).
18
 
                                                 
15 The estimated difference in covariate after adjusting propensity scores is lower than the unadjusted difference 
between treatment and control groups. However, our qualitative conclusion remains unchanged with or without 
weighting. 
16 See, for example, Karlan and Zinman (2008b) for problems with self-reported credit data. 
17
 When all independent variables are discrete (as is the case with most of our variables), the LPM is fairly general, 
and fitted probabilities lie within the interval. In addition, the LPM has also the advantage of allowing 
straightforward interpretation of the regression coefficients. Moreover, we compute Huber-White standard error to 
take into account the heteroscedastic error term of LPM. 
18 Alternatives to cluster-adjusted standard errors include the hierarchical linear modelling, two-step procedure by 
Donald and Lang (2007) and the Bell and McCaffrey‘s (2002) biased reduced linearization estimator for micro 
data. 
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Secondly, children of the same household are likely to be similar in a wide variety of 
characteristics. It follows that there may be large intra-household correlations. Moreover, the 
data were collected by using households as the survey unit. Therefore we also estimate 
standard errors clustering at the household level as there is usually more than one school age 
child within a household.  
 
Checking the Validity of the Instrument: 
Before presenting our main findings, we discuss if our chosen instrument is a suitable one.  
The first-stage regression of equation (9) using a standard Tobit model shows that the 
instrument is highly statistically significant with t-statistic of 8.5. The coefficient estimate is 
positive and also economically significant, implying that our instrument is significantly 
related to the demand for credit. We also estimate the participation decision equation by 
regressing a binary indicator for participation on an indicator of interaction between eligibility 
and program village dummies (plus all controls). The results are stronger with t-statistic of 12. 
The regression using basic controls and no controls results in stronger coefficient estimates. 
Since we have a single instrument for the credit variable, we cannot test the exogeneity of the 
instrument as in an over-identified model. The remaining concern is whether the instrument 
satisfies the exclusion restriction, i.e., whether eligibility affects child labour or school 
enrolment only through participation in the credit program or the amount of credit borrowed. 
Although the exclusion restriction is not directly testable, we address this concern in a number 
of ways.  First, we estimate a reduced form regression to examine the effect of loan eligibility 
on school enrolment/child labour. The results indicate that that there is no effect of eligibility 
or program placement on school enrolment and child labour.  We also estimate an equation in 
which credit is instrumented but instrument eligibility enters the second-stage regression 
directly (and naturally in the first stage regression). By definition of IV, the instrument should 
be uncorrelated with the outcomes of interest through any channels other than their effects via 
the endogenous regressors. Therefore, once the credit is instrumented, eligibility itself should 
have no effect on schooling or child labour when both instrumented credit and eligibility 
status are entered as controls for child labour/school enrolment equation. The results do not 
indicate any significant effect of eligibility in any of the specifications.
19
 Finally we stress that 
our identification strategy does not depend exclusively on the eligibility rule since we also 
exploit the variation in credit demand among households in different villages based on the 
availability of program in different villages. 
                                                 
19 The detailed results of the first-stage regression are available upon request. 
  
18 
 
5. Empirical Findings 
 
This section reports our empirical findings where the estimated value of credit from the first-
stage regression (equation (9)) is used as the regressor in the second-stage estimation 
(equation (8)). We estimate the impacts of credit extended to women and men separately.
20
 
This is to see how the gender of participants in the microcredit program affects schooling and 
work decision for their children.  As mentioned earlier, Pitt and Khandker (1998) and 
Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) report that women tend to show a stronger preference than 
men for educating their children.  Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright (2006) also find that 
women's participation in microcredit programs helps to improve women's empowerment.  If 
microcredit empowers women, then it may also increase the relative chance of girls‘ 
schooling.  If parents have differential preferences for the education of their daughters and 
sons, then education outcomes could be different for boys and girls, which could be 
determined by a household production function (Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982). We thus 
estimate the results separately for boys and girls by credit given to both women and men using 
three sets of control variables: ―no controls‖ (excluding the X and Z variables), ―basic 
controls‖ (some household and child demographic variables, and village controls), and ―full 
controls‖ (the full set X and Z variables). The list of the full controls is chosen from a larger 
set of controls by selecting those that were most significant. In identifying the set of control 
variables we first consider the variables (e.g., household and village characteristics) that the 
MOs use to select a household and that are likely to determine household demand for credit. 
We then include a number of regressors to take into account the number of siblings, family 
composition that can potentially determine the children‘s schooling or work status. The final 
set of covariates included in X and Z is listed in the Appendix. 
 
Table 2 reports the estimates of the second-stage regression using the LPM and probit models 
under different covariate specifications. Columns (1) and (4) represent the treatment effects 
without any controls. The estimates in column (1) can be considered the Wald estimates, 
representing the difference in the probability of child labour between children of microcredit 
participants and non-participants divided by the amount of credit borrowed by the 
participating households. The Wald estimates in Table 2 show that credit is associated with 
                                                 
20 Though credit is given to both women and men in different villages, credit groups are never mixed by gender. 
Households do not have choice over which gender is to participate since MOs select one or the other gender, but 
not both. 
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higher probabilities of child labour for girls but lower probabilities of child labour for boys, 
regardless of whether credit is obtained by men or women.  However, the coefficients are not 
statistically significant. Moreover the Wald estimates are likely to suffer from the omitted 
variable bias since parental decisions on schooling and child labour are likely to be influenced 
by household demographic and socio-economic characteristics.  
 
To address the above issues, we consider two sets of control variables, basic control and full 
control variables, as discussed in Section 4.  In Table 2, the results from the LPM model are 
reported in columns (2) and (3) and those from the probit model are reported in columns (5) 
and (6). In columns (3) and (6), the full set of controls is included, which is our preferred 
specification. All coefficients are estimated as marginal effects calculated at the mean. The 
results in columns (3) and (6) portray a clear picture.  Microcredit significantly increases the 
probability of child labour for girls.  For boys, there is some indication that microcredit 
reduces the probability of child labour especially when credit is obtained by women.  Overall, 
the impact of microcredit on child labour is positive and significant.  The qualitative results 
are independent of whether credit is obtained by men or women.   For example, microcredit 
increases the probability of child labour for girls by 7.9% according to the probit model and 
13.7% according to the LPM model.  The probability increases by 8.4% and 14.3% 
respectively when women are borrowers.  For boys, women‘s credit has a marginal negative 
effect on child labour.  Table 2 also shows that girls are affected more adversely, and boys 
more favourably, when credit is obtained by men than by women, although these estimates are 
not statistically significant. A Hausman-like test does not support the difference in treatment 
effect between men and women borrowers. Finally the magnitude of the estimated coefficients 
increases as we move from basic controls to full controls.  The overall finding is that 
microcredit clearly increases the likelihood of child labour for girls while the impact on boys 
is less clear.  
 
--- Table 2 goes about here. --- 
 
Table 3 reports the effect of microcredit on school enrolment. The results overwhelmingly 
indicate that access to microcredit negatively affects children‘s school enrolment. This is true 
across all regression models and regardless of whether credit is obtained by men or women.  
The negative effect is especially pronounced for girls although, for boys, it is statistically 
insignificant. For example, microcredit decreases the probability of school enrolment for girls 
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by 22.6% according to the LPM model and 19.2% according to the probit model.  We also 
find that the negative effect on girls‘ school enrolment is larger when microcredit is obtained 
by men than by women: in the probit model, the probability changes from 19.4% to 22.8%.  
The negative effect on boys‘ school enrolment, while statistically insignificant, is larger when 
women are borrowers.  One might surmise that this could be an indication of gender 
preference by parents.  However, Hausman-type tests do not reject the equality of the 
coefficients between the sexes of the borrower.  Once again, the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients increases as we move from basic controls to full controls, suggesting that a fuller 
picture requires the analysis of how a household‘s socio-economic characteristics affect child 
labour and school enrolment.   We turn to this below. 
 
--- Table 3 goes about here. --- 
 
Table 4 shows how the probabilities of children‘s school enrolment and child labour are 
associated with other control variables.  The results are mostly consistent with previous 
studies. For controls at the household level, children‘s school enrolment is positively 
associated with education attained by any adult member of the household, the household 
head‘s education level, and the male head of the household, while it is negatively associated 
with the number of younger siblings and the age of the household head.  Presence of a mother 
in the household has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on schooling.  For controls 
at village level and beyond, children‘s school enrolment is positively related to presence of 
secondary school or college, and infrastructure such as health facility and brick-built road.  
Interestingly, presence of grocery market and bus stand has a negative effect on children‘s 
schooling. A primary school in the village does not have any statistically significant effect on 
school enrolment or child labour.  This may reflect the fact that almost all villages have a 
primary school. Similarly rice prices do not have any effect on either school enrolment or 
child labour possibly because the geographical variation in rice prices is very small. The sign 
of the adult male wage coefficient in the child labour equation is positive but statistically and 
economically insignificant, suggesting that adult male and child labour are imperfect 
substitutes.
21
 
--- Table 4 goes about here. --- 
                                                 
21 According to Basu and Van (1998), if children and adults are substitutes in production (the "substitution 
axiom"), the prevalence of child labour depresses adult wages —a condition under which a ban on child labour 
may be desirable. Our results indirectly suggest that this might not be the case. Moreover, when we regress adult 
male wages on child labour, we find a positive coefficient (t-ratio=1.53), indicating that the substitution axiom does 
not hold in our case. 
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The results reported in Tables 2 and 3 do not change qualitatively if we change the treatment 
variable. Table 5 shows the treatment-on-treated effect using a binary participation indicator 
as the treatment variable. The estimated effect using two-stage least squares (2SLS) is 
identical to the indirect least squares estimate obtained from taking the ratio of the reduced-
form coefficients, because we are estimating a just identified equation. The results are 
qualitatively similar to the previous estimates which used credit as participation variable. 
Girls‘ education continues to be affected adversely by parental participation in microcredit 
programs whether credit is obtained by men or women. In probit results, for example, we find 
that women‘s microcredit borrowing increases the probability of girls‘ child labour by 13.7% 
and decreases the probability their school enrolment by 44.4%.  The magnitude of the impact 
estimates is similar in case the borrower is a man.  The corresponding coefficient estimates for 
child labour for boys are not statistically significant and have mixed signs. Overall, binary 
participation measures generate considerably larger coefficient estimates for girls. However, 
these results are only indicative as they do not take into account the variation of treatment 
intensity, and treat the program effect to be the same for all children in the treatment group. 
 
--- Table 5 goes about here. --- 
 
The standard errors reported in the above tables are corrected for clustering at the village level 
and weighted by the propensity score to take into account the choice-based sampling. The 
standard errors in square brackets take into account intra-sibling correlations within a 
household. Both standard errors are typically of similar magnitude. Since they do not differ 
much, we report below the regression results only with the clustered standard error at the 
village level. We also experimented with the two-step procedure discussed by Donald and 
Lang (2007). In our case this amounts to estimating village fixed effects (household fixed 
effects when considering intra-sibling correlation) in an equation like (8), and then regressing 
the estimated fixed effects on instrumented credit and other village covariates (household 
covariates). Since the estimation results are similar, they are not reported for the sake of 
brevity.  In what follows, we report the results of impact estimates separately by various 
control variables. 
 
5.1. Impact Estimates by Children’s School Age 
Table 6 reports the impact estimates for children aged 7-12 (primary school age) and 12-16 
(secondary school age: up to grade 10).  As before, we use the binary treatment status 
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indicator as the participation variable.  The results show that the adverse effect of microcredit 
on children at the primary school age is mostly significant regardless of the gender of 
borrowers and children. Girls at the primary school age are especially adversely affected than 
boys, and more so when credit is obtained by men.  For example, the probability of their 
school enrolment decreases by 33% when credit is obtained by women and by 41% when 
credit is obtained by men.   For children at the secondary school age, microcredit has a mixed 
effect.  Women‘s credit has a statistically significant negative impact on girls‘ schooling while 
men‘s credit also has a negative but statistically insignificant effect, possibly due to smaller 
sample size of male participants.  For boys at the secondary school age, microcredit increases 
their likelihood of school enrolment although coefficient estimates are not statistically 
significant.  Overall, microcredit adversely affects younger children more than their older 
siblings, and girls more than boys, irrespective of the gender of the borrower. 
 
--- Table 6 goes about here. --- 
 
5.2. Impact Estimates by Household Income 
Household income plays an important role in determining child labour and school enrolment 
(Basu and Van 1998; Edmonds 2005; Bhalotra 2007; Belly and Lochner 2007). Poorer 
families are more likely to take their children out of school in times of need. Poverty is 
associated with increased level of parental stress, depression and poor health — conditions 
which might adversely affect parents‘ ability to nurture their children.  Impact estimates by 
household income also allow us to examine the hypothesis implicit in Basu and Van‘s (1998) 
‗luxury axiom‘ that parents send their children to work and keep them from school only if 
household income falls below a certain (subsistence) level. However, we cannot treat income 
as exogenous.  Income is endogenous because the amount of credit borrowed by the 
household directly affects household income. If the participation in microcredit programs has 
a positive effect on household income, then including income as an explanatory variable 
would underestimate the actual effect of the program.  Moreover, children‘s contribution to 
household income also makes the income variable endogenous. Since children working on the 
family farm are not paid a wage, their contribution cannot be deducted from total income. 
Even if we could observe income from child labour, the endogeneity problem would not be 
resolved by simply subtracting it from the total household income if the labour supply of 
different household members is jointly determined. Income is endogenous for another reason: 
children living in poorer families may have adverse home environment or face other 
  
23 
 
problems.  Such omitted variables may continue to affect their schooling or child labour even 
if family income may increase. 
 
There are mainly two approaches in dealing with the endogeneity issue: fixed effects 
estimation (Blau 1999) and instrumental variable technique. While the fixed effects estimation 
should eliminate any bias from permanent differences in family or children, it may exacerbate 
bias due to unobserved temporary family shocks (Dahl and Lochner 2005). In the absence of 
appropriate instruments for income in our context, we use parental education as a proxy for 
permanent income.  If education has a positive return, families with more educated parents are 
expected to have more income. Clearly parental education is not affected by program 
participation or child labour supply.  We use three categories of parental education: Low refers 
to those households where the highest level of education obtained by parents is primary (0-4 
years of schooling) or less; Middle refers to households where the highest level of education 
obtained by parents is more than primary but less than a high school degree (5-10 years of 
schooling), and High includes households where one of the parents obtained at least a high 
school degree (11 or more years of schooling).  We adopt the following functional form: 
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             (10) 
 
where we incorporate the household‘s permanent income by interacting the three categories of 
parental education with the amount of credit borrowed.  These interaction terms capture the 
differences in slope across different levels of education within the treatment group.  
 
Equation (10) is unidentified since the number of endogenous regressors exceeds the number 
of instruments. Therefore, we need additional instruments that are correlated with the 
interaction terms between credit and different education categories.  Since credit is interacted 
with education dummies all the predicted values will be closely correlated. In the absence of 
suitable identifying instruments, we use estimated credit from the first-stage and interact the 
education dummy variables with the estimated credit variable.  Our equation thus becomes:  
 
 11 )ˆ()ˆ()ˆ( 543210 ijkljkjkjkjkjkjkkijlijkl HighDMiddleDLowDZXY  
 
where Dˆ  is the credit demand estimated from equation (9).   
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Figure 4 shows how children‘s school enrolment and child labour vary as the level of parental 
education changes. The graphs show that there is a positive relationship between children‘s 
school enrolment and parental education and a negative relationship between child labour and 
parental education. Households in the control group tend to have a higher level of children‘s 
school enrolment and lower incidence of child labour.  
 
--- Figure 4 goes about here. --- 
 
Table 7 reports the impact estimates based on different levels of parental education.  A clear 
picture emerges.  Households with the lowest parental education are those with the largest and 
significant adverse effect of microcredit on children‘s schooling.  For example, the probit 
estimates imply that the probability of children‘s school enrolment decreases by 29.3% in 
these households while that of child labour increases by 9.7%.  For households with medium 
to high levels of parental education, the impact is largely insignificant, although there is some 
indication that girls are adversely affected by microcredit in households with medium level of 
parental education.  Given our interpretation of parental education as a proxy for household 
income, these results indicate that microcredit to the poorest of the poor households neither 
alleviates the problem of child labour nor improves children‘s schooling. These households 
engage their children more in work in order to generate immediate returns from their 
microenterprise projects.  An additional observation is that, while statistically insignificant, 
the likelihood of children‘s school enrolment is positive in households with high education.  
Figure 4 also shows that children are more likely to be sent to school as household income 
proxied by parental education increases.  Taken together, these results indirectly support Basu 
and Van‘s (1998) ‗luxury axiom‘.   
 
--- Table 7 goes about here. --- 
 
5.3. Microcredit, Household Income and Child Schooling 
The results in the previous section have shown that children‘s schooling is less likely to be 
adversely affected if they come from relatively less poor or more educated family. Microcredit 
given to high income households actually reduces the probability of child labour and improves 
children‘s schooling.  To the extent that microcredit can increase household income, one 
might argue that it could help poor households to graduate out of poverty, thereby improving 
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children‘s education in the long term.  Conversely, if escape from poverty proceeds only very 
slowly, then microcredit may intensify the problem of child labour and worsen human capital 
formation.  We examine this issue below based on the regression coefficients in Table 7. 
 
Consider the difference between the coefficients for the low and middle income groups in 
Table 7. Since the coefficient estimates measure the difference in probabilities between 
treated and untreated households in different income groups, the difference in estimated 
coefficients between two treated groups can be interpreted as the difference-in-difference 
estimate of the impact of household income.  Then the first column in Table 7 suggests that a 
10 percent increase in credit given to middle-income households reduces the probability of 
children‘s schooling by about 2.6 percent less than if it had been given to low-income 
households. A similar calculation for child labour indicates that a 10 percent increase in credit 
given to middle-income households increases the probability of child labour by 0.6 percent 
less than if it had been given to low-income households.  While the adverse effect of 
microcredit is reduced when household income increases from low to middle, the adverse 
effect remains nonetheless.  Microcredit can improve children‘s schooling and reduce child 
labour only for high-income households: a 10 percent increase in credit given to high-income 
households improves children‘s schooling by 0.8 percent and reduces child labour by 0.4 
percent than if it had been given to middle-income households. Given the modest increase in 
income due to participation in microcredit programs,
22
 however, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that child labour remains an issue to be tackled by MOs and policy makers rather 
than by letting the households graduate out of poverty. With microcredit alone, it would 
require a substantial amount of time for households to break out of poverty. 
 
5.4. Impact Estimates by Land Ownership 
In many rural areas in developing countries, land is often the most significant asset the 
household owns.  If land can be used as collateral for general-purpose loans, then land 
ownership may have a positive effect on children‘s schooling.   In this case, more land implies 
more household wealth, and the possible positive relationship between land ownership and 
children‘s schooling can be considered a confirmation of the positive relationship between 
household wealth and children‘s schooling.   However, microcredit is mainly to be used to set 
up a household enterprise and the purchase of external labour is not often possible.  Moreover 
households in the treated group have microcredit as the main source of loans. Therefore we do 
                                                 
22
 See, for example, Islam (2007) and references therein. 
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not expect a positive relationship between land ownership and children‘s schooling.  Rather 
we may expect land ownership to have a negative effect since adult labour may need to be 
shifted from family farms to the household enterprise, increasing the need for child labour in 
family farms.  
 
To examine this, we divide households into two groups: those with less than a half acre of 
land (poorer households) and those with more than a half acre of land (less poor 
households).
23
 Although land ownership of less than a half acre of land is the eligibility 
criterion for microcredit, there were some households with larger land who still obtained 
microcredit. Table 8 reports the impact estimates by land ownership. The results show that 
microcredit has different effects in the two groups of households.  In poorer households, it 
decreases the likelihood of school enrolment for girls while decreasing the likelihood of child 
labour for boys.  In less poor households, the result is reversed.  Although it is not clear why 
less poor households tend to keep boys at work when they obtain microcredit, we surmise that 
less poor households engage boys more in agriculture activity, while households with 
marginal landholding engage girls more in the household enterprise. 
 
--- Table 8 goes about here. --- 
 
Many of the results are statistically insignificant possibly because of relatively small sample 
size. However, overall results also show that our earlier findings were not driven by pre-
existing differences in the characteristics between treatment and control groups. It is to be 
noted that poorer treated households have observed characteristics that are very similar to 
their non-treated counterparts.
24
 Once again, our results show that poor households tend to put 
girls to work and keep them away from school when they obtain microcredit.  
 
6. Additional Robustness Check 
 
6.1. Potential Identification Issue: Causal Effect or Selection Bias? 
                                                 
23 Household land ownership is less likely to be affected by microcredit. There is not enough evidence in the data 
that shows a different pattern of buying and selling land after becoming a member of a MO. Since microcredit is 
mainly provided for non-agricultural purposes, households are not entitled to buy land using the credit. Also, there 
is no evidence that households sell land to become eligible for microcredit. 
24
 Descriptive statistics for this sub-group is not reported here, but similar results are available in Islam (2007). 
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Section 5 has reported on how microcredit affects children‘s schooling and child labour under 
the assumption that the differences in schooling and child labour between the treatment and 
control groups are not due to underlying differences in household characteristics. It could be 
argued, however, that households from program villages that are less likely to send their 
children to school are more likely to participate in microcredit programs. If this is the case, 
then our estimates would be picking up effects that are attributable to pre-existing differences 
in household characteristics between the treatment and control groups, and not to the 
participation in microcredit programs. In addressing the issue of possible selection bias, we 
first note from Table 1 that many of the household characteristics are not statistically different 
between the treatment and control groups.  Any remaining differences have been accounted 
for by using propensity score weights, which also significantly reduce the differences between 
the two groups. Possible selection bias resulting from unobservable variables has been further 
addressed using the IV strategy.  Nonetheless there may still remain some potential 
confounders that would violate the exclusion restriction. Given our efforts to control for 
confounders, the risk of such distortions does not seem large.   
 
In order to substantiate the above claim, we conduct additional robustness checks using 
alternative approaches. We first use regression-adjusted years of education for older siblings: 
children who are 16-20 years old. This group of children is less likely to be affected by their 
parents‘ microcredit since they would have completed secondary school or dropped out before 
their parents obtained microcredit. We find no statistically significant difference between the 
children of treatment and control groups (t-ratio = 0.7).  This result is also consistent with our 
finding that older children are less adversely affected by microcredit, presumably because 
their schooling period is less exposed to microcredit and younger children can work in the 
household enterprise instead of their older siblings. Furthermore, the opportunity cost of using 
child labour in the household enterprise increases with children‘s age.  If they are at the 
advanced stage in school, much of the investment in schooling that has already been made 
would be forfeited or, if they are engaged in market work, their higher wage earnings would 
need to be sacrificed. 
 
Next, we also control selection bias using an alternative method. We consider corrections for 
endogeneity using reduced form residuals that lead to a control function method of accounting 
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for both selection and endogeneity.
25
 This is also important if the impact of microcredit varies 
across households. In that case, IV/2SLS may not estimate the average treatment effect of 
credit. There are, however, different approaches to estimate control functions, and not all 
these procedures produce consistent estimates of the treatment effect. We adopt the procedure 
suggested by Vella (1993), which correctly identifies the treatment effect parameter in our 
context.
26
 We first obtain generalized residuals using either Tobit (for credit as the treatment 
variable) or probit (for binary treatment indicator) for the reduced form first-stage equation, 
and then use the estimated residuals as an additional regressor in the second stage.
27
 The 
results, available upon request from the authors, are similar to those reported before.  
 
6.2. Alternative Measures of Children’s Educational Attainment 
 
In this sub-section, we consider the impact of microcredit participation on various alternative 
measures of children‘s educational attainment. While the previous measure of school 
enrolment has the advantage of capturing the current status of school age children, it does not 
measure the achievement of those who are not in school at the time of the survey. Two 
alternative measures are the number of years of schooling completed and the ‗education gap‘. 
In Bangladesh, the age at which children are expected to start school does not vary cross the 
country. The age at which a child is legally supposed to go to school is also the same. 
Therefore, we can construct a variable ‗education gap‘ to measure the achievement in terms of 
grade completion for a given age. The education gap can be defined as: 
 
Education Gap = max{0, Expected education – Actual Education}, where 






16age7 if 6age
6age if 0
Education Expected  
For example, if a child successfully stayed in school as expected, the gap is zero. If a child 
encountered problems such as late entry, failed grades, or drop-outs, then the gap is a positive 
number. If a child never attended school, then the gap is the level of expected education at that 
age. Finally, following Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997), educational attainment is 
                                                 
25
 The control function approach estimates the average treatment effect by controlling directly for the correlation 
between the error term and the outcome of equations with the treatment variable. It treats selection bias as an 
omitted variable problem and augments the outcome equation by a term to control for this omission. The traditional 
example is the Heckman‘s sample selection model that augments the outcome equation by an estimate of the Mills 
ratio. 
26 Garen (1984) suggests a linear control function estimator to correct for endogeneity. However, Garen‘s approach 
is appropriate when the dependent variable in the first stage can take a value over a continuous range and it should 
be uncensored. Similarly the two-stage conditional maximum likelihood approach of Rivers and Vuong (1988) is 
not applicable as the approach also requires that the credit variable be continuous (see Vella 1993, Ravallion and 
Wodon 2000). 
27 This model is identified even without the exclusion restrictions because of the non-linearity of the residuals. 
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obtained by defining a grade-for-age dependent variable as 100*[Education Grade/Expected 
Education], where education Grade is the number of years a child successfully completed in 
school. 
 
The control function estimates using the above educational achievement measures are 
reported in Table 9. The results are based on OLS regressions in the second stage for each of 
these measures.
28
 The negative coefficients for grade completion and grade-for-age, and the 
positive coefficient for education gap all imply that participation in microcredit program 
adversely affects children‘s grade achievement. Once more, girls are more adversely affected 
than boys: coefficient estimates for girls are larger than for boys and statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level.  Women‘s participation in microcredit reduces girls‘ education by about 3 
years of schooling while the corresponding decrease for boys‘ education is about 0.2 years of 
schooling.  Men‘s participation has a larger negative impact on girls‘ grade completion—a 
reduction of 3.8 years in schooling compared to the girls from the control group. The effects 
on boys‘ school achievement are not statistically significant in general. The results from all 
three measures of educational achievement are similar, which is not particularly surprising 
since the three measures are likely to be highly correlated.
29
  
 
--- Table 9 goes about here. --- 
 
6.3 Are Children Really Working in Household Enterprises? 
A possible explanation for the adverse effect of microcredit on children‘s schooling is that 
microcredit increases demand for labour in household enterprises set up with microcredit, 
which may cause children‘s time to be diverted away from school into household enterprises.  
We examine this issue below. We classify a child‘s current status into five different categories 
based on the detailed occupational information collected during the survey.  They are (i) self-
employment activity (in household enterprise), (ii) agricultural activity, (iii) day labour, (iv) 
service-related activity, and (v) student (enrolled in school). We run a multinomial logit model 
where the parameter of interest is the coefficient corresponding to the instrumented credit 
                                                 
28 We use OLS instead of conventional Tobit, because in the first stage we estimate credit demand using Tobit. 
Using Tobit in the second stage then creates further difficulty in consistently estimating coefficients unless the first 
stage is exactly correctly specified (Angrist 2001). This is not the case if we use OLS.  
29 The coefficient of the residual from the first stage provides an exogeneity test and most of the results reject the 
exogeneity of credit. Adding squared or higher-order terms of the control function does not change the sign of the 
coefficient, and the magnitude of the coefficients becomes stable. The higher order terms are not statistically 
significant either.  
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variable obtained from equation (9). Table 10 reports the odds-ratios and corresponding 
marginal effects of the treatment variable.
30
 The results show that, for children from treated 
households, the odds of being in self-employment activities instead of being in school are 
more than doubled. The corresponding marginal effect indicates that children from treated 
households are 26.6 percent more likely to work in self-employment activities than those from 
non-treated households.  The odds-ratio is higher and negative for agricultural activity. 
However, the corresponding marginal effect is economically insignificant.  The rest of the 
coefficient estimates (day labour and service-related activities) are not statistically significant.  
Finally, the marginal effect for the student status implies that children from treated households 
have a 26.6 percent lower chance of being enrolled in school than those from non-treated 
households.  Overall, these results support the explanation that children from treated 
households are more likely to work in household enterprises set up with microcredit.    
 
--- Table 10 goes about here. --- 
 
7. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This paper has studied the impact of access to microcredit on children‘s education and child 
labour using a new, large and nationally representative data set from various microcredit 
programs in Bangladesh. The results overwhelmingly indicate that household participation in 
microcredit programs has adverse effects on children‘s schooling, which are especially 
pronounced for girls.  Younger children are more adversely affected than their older siblings 
and the children of poorer and less educated households are affected most adversely. It 
appears that children taken out from school are more likely to work in household enterprises 
that are set up with microcredit than in other types of work.  Overall our results suggest that 
care needs to be taken in assessing the effectiveness of microcredit programs.  While 
microcredit programs can alleviate poverty and contribute to rural economy in the short term, 
they can also result in unintended consequences of adversely affecting children‘s schooling, 
which could exacerbate poverty in the longer term.  An additional concern relates to the 
gender-asymmetric impact of access to microcredit. Government policies aimed at rectifying 
                                                 
30 We conducted a Hausman-like test to examine whether the maintained assumption of independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) is appropriate in our case. The results do not reject the null hypothesis that IIA holds, hence the 
multinomial logit model is suitable for the data. 
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gender imbalance in education may turn out to be less effective in the presence many active 
microcredit programs. 
 
A number of policies can be adopted to mitigate the adverse effect on child labour and 
schooling so that microcredit can benefit both current and future generations (Wydick 1999). 
At the level of microcredit organizations, the gestation period between actual loan 
disbursement and the start of repayment can be extended. This allows many households to 
invest in suitable investment projects where they may find a greater balance between 
employing children at household enterprises and sending them to school.  Reduced interest 
rates and longer repayment periods can also help households to become less myopic.  In 
addition, increases in the size of credit allowing employment of external labour can take the 
burden off from households to resort to child labour.  The latter suggests that microcredit 
organizations may eventually need to look further and consider financing rural enterprises at 
the village level rather than at the household level.  These measures that are directed at 
microcredit organizations alone are by no means sufficient in reducing child labour and 
improving child schooling.  They need to be complemented by policies that directly target 
children‘s education, of which the essence is to increase the return on education perceived by 
parents.  In sum, microcredit programs need to be complemented by other policies to tackle 
the multiple goals of poverty reduction, human capital formation, and social development.  
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Appendix 
 
Control Variables Included in the Regression: 
Basic Control:  
Child characteristics: Age, age squared, sex* 
 
Household characteristics: landholding (less than one acre, one acre to 2 acres, 2 acres to less 
than 5 acres, more than 5 acres), mother‘s education, maximum education attained by any 
member of the household, age of father, sex of household head. 
 
Village characteristics: Presence of primary school, secondary school. 
 
*Sex is included when combined regression is run. 
 
Full Control: Basic Control plus 
Child characteristics: Sex*age, first-born, second-born, third-born, fourth-born, fifth or higher 
born, number of younger siblings, number of elder sisters. 
 
Household characteristics: Number of children aged 0-6, 7-15, education of father (low (0-4 
years), middle (5-10 years), high (11 and above)), age of mother, presence of mother. 
 
Village characteristics: religious school, distance to the nearest school, child wage, adult 
wage, presence of brick-built road, presence of hospital, post office, grocery market, bus 
stand, distance to the nearest sub-districts, price of rice. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variables 
Treatment 
(I) 
Control 
(II) 
Difference 
III=(I-II) 
Child Characteristics (7-16 years old) 
 Child in work (in percentage)    
 Boys 16.9 13.8 3.0 
 Girls 11.0 9.3 1.7 
 Child in school (in percentage)    
 Boys 69.3 74.7 -5.5 
 Girls 76.6 78.9 -2.3 
 Age of child (in years) 11.497 11.494 0.003 
 Sex of child (percentage of girls) 55.7 55.6 0.1 
Household Characteristics 
 Mother age (in years) 37.66 38.14 -0.48 
 Mother schooling (years of education) 1.09 1.54 -0.45 
 Father age (in years) 45.85 46.80 -0.95 
 Father schooling (years of education) 2.64 3.20 -0.56 
 Household size 6.56 6.48 -0.08 
 Number of children    
                           0-6 years 0.81 0.79 0.02 
      6-16 years 2.79 2.66 0.13 
Maximum education by any household member    
 Male borrower (years of education) 4.78 5.29 -0.50 
 Female borrower (years of education) 4.17 4.57 -0.40 
 Amount of land (in decimals) 64.7 91.2 -26.6 
Village Characteristics 
Program 
village (I) 
Control 
village (II) 
Difference 
III=(I-II) 
 Primary school (%) 86.25 90.91 -4.66 
 Secondary school (%) 27.27 31.25 -3.98 
 Union health centre (%) 17.5 10 7.5 
 Distance to nearest sub-district (km) 7.14 11.91 -4.77 
 Presence of r grocery market (%) 22.5 18.2 4.3 
 Presence of bus stand (%) 15 9.1 5.9 
 Presence of post office (%) 20 18.2 1.8 
 Presence of telephone office (%) 6.3 9.1 -2.8 
  Presence of UP office (%) 13.8 18.2 -4.4 
 
Notes: The third column presents the difference between columns (1) and (2). Differences that are statistically 
significant at less than five percent are marked bold. 
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Table 2: Impact Estimates of the Participation in Microcredit Program 
on Child Labour 
  
  LPM    Probit  
 
No 
Control 
Basic  
Control 
      Full 
      Control  
No  
Control 
Basic 
 Control 
Full  
Control 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Women and Men’s credit      
 
All -0.0146 0.0252 0.0801  -0.0144 0.0192 0.0541 
 (0.0291) (0.0290) (0.0441)+  (0.0287) (0.0219) (0.0023)+ 
 [0.0228] [0.0276] [0.0418]+  [0.0225] [0.0203] [0.0304]+ 
        
Boys -0.0433 -0.0121 0.0034  -0.043 -0.0136 -0.0106 
 (0.0357) (0.0383) (0.0583)  (0.0354) (0.0297) (0.0418 
 [0.0320] [0.0370] [0.0526]  [0.0316] [0.0280] [0.0383 
        
Girls 0.0161 0.0502 0.1367  0.0158 0.0372 0.0794 
 (0.0373) (0.0394) (0.0594)**  (0.0363) (0.0241) (0.0336)** 
 [0.0309] [0.0395] [0.0609]**  [0.0301] [0.0239] [0.0351]** 
 
Women's Credit 
     
 
All -0.0134 0.0335 0.087  -0.0133 0.0276 0.0558 
 (0.0285) (0.0289) (0.0456)+  (0.0281) (0.0213) (0.0302)+ 
 [0.0231] [0.0284] [0.0426]**  [0.0228] [0.0203] [0.0302]+ 
        
Boys -0.042 -0.0029 0.0129  -0.0417 -0.0018 -0.0093 
 (0.0353) (0.0369) (0.0590)  (0.0349) (0.0261) (0.0377) 
 [0.0325] [0.0377] [0.0861]  [0.0320] [0.0257] [0.0258]+ 
        
Girls 0.0172 0.0611 0.1426  0.0168 0.0442 0.0835 
 (0.0370) (0.0400) (0.0610)**  (0.0361) (0.0241)+ (0.0348)** 
 [0.0312] [0.0409] [0.0626]**  [0.0304] [0.0245]+ [0.0363]** 
 
Men's Credit 
 
      
All -0.0187 0.0252 0.0774  -0.0184 0.0199 0.064 
 (0.0426) (0.0503) (0.0746)  (0.0420) (0.0323) (0.0378)+ 
 [0.0363] [0.0452] [0.0681]  [0.0358] [0.0293] [0.0373]+ 
       
Boys -0.0671 -0.0285 -0.0239  -0.0664 -0.0233 -0.0112 
 (0.0550) (0.0643) (0.0912)  (0.0542) (0.0435) (0.0456) 
 [0.0506] [0.0603] [0.0841]  [0.0497] [0.0405] [0.0426] 
        
Girls 0.0345 0.0685 0.1507  0.0339 0.0416 0.1008 
 (0.0570) (0.0690) (0.1094)  (0.0556) (0.0285) (0.0421)** 
 [0.0497] [0.0654] [0.1040]  [0.0483] [0.0273] [0.0439]** 
Notes: All the results are the marginal effects of instrumented credit variable using IV regressions. The 
regressions include child, household, village characteristics and district fixed effects (except the first and fourth 
columns). ‗Basic control‘ is the subset of ‗full control‘ and includes some household and child demographic 
variables. Standard errors presented in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the village level using the 
formulas in Liang and Zeger (1986), while those in brackets are corrected for clustering at the household level. 
The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by the average credit borrowed by the respective group of 
households. All the estimates are also weighted propensity scores. Coefficients with + are significant at the 10%, 
those with ** at the 5%, and those with * at the 1%. 
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Table 3: Impact Estimates of the Participation in Microcredit Program  
on Children’s School Enrolment 
 
  LPM    Probit  
 
No 
Control Basic Control 
Full  
Control  
No 
Control 
Basic 
Control 
Full 
Control 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Women and Men’s Credit      
 
All -0.0924 -0.0915 -0.1588  -0.0925 -0.0959 -0.1623 
 (0.0468)+ (0.0488)+ (0.0688)**  (0.0470)** (0.0493)+ (0.0273)** 
 [0.0327]* [0.0410]** [0.0609]*  [0.0330]* [0.0416]** [0.0622]* 
        
Boys -0.0658 -0.0686 -0.0756  -0.0657 -0.0938 -0.0661 
 (0.0513) (0.0569) (0.0825)  (0.0516) (0.0613) (0.1148) 
 [0.0432] [0.0500] [0.0768]  [0.0434] [0.0547]+ [0.1049] 
        
Girls -0.1208 -0.0938 -0.2261  -0.1211 -0.0765 -0.1918 
 (0.0596)** (0.0600) (0.0905)**  (0.0600)** (0.0553) (0.0850)** 
 [0.0432]* [0.0568]+ [0.0837]*  [0.0437]* [0.0527] [0.0782]** 
 
Women's Credit 
     
 
All -0.0908 -0.0969 -0.1717  -0.0908 -0.1032 -0.1733 
 (0.0452)** (0.0475)** (0.0694)**  (0.0454)** (0.0476)** (0.0685)** 
 [0.0332]* [0.0424]** [0.0620]*  [0.0334]* [0.0427]** [0.0632]* 
        
Boys -0.0655 -0.0752 -0.0965  -0.0654 -0.1043 -0.1237 
 (0.0504) (0.0549) (0.0846)  (0.0507) (0.0593)+ (0.0863) 
 [0.0441] [0.0515] [0.0780]  [0.0443] [0.0561]+ [0.0839] 
        
Girls -0.1179 -0.1017 -0.2296  -0.1182 -0.0842 -0.194 
 (0.0590)** (0.0603)+ (0.0921)**  (0.0594)** (0.0549) (0.0863)** 
 [0.0436]* [0.0583]+ [0.0853]*  [0.0441]* [0.0538] [0.0798]** 
 
Men's Credit 
     
       
All -0.0834 -0.0629 -0.1423  -0.0833 -0.0747 -0.1607 
 (0.0664) (0.0814) (0.1108)  (0.0665) (0.0790) (0.1067) 
 [0.0515] [0.0654] [0.0984]  [0.0516] [0.0634] [0.0954]+ 
       
Boys -0.0295 -0.0153 -0.0194  -0.0293 -0.0482 -0.0781 
 (0.0807) (0.0980) (0.1372)  (0.0803) (0.1015) (0.1356) 
 [0.0681] [0.0803] [0.1223]  [0.0678] [0.0838] [0.1240] 
        
Girls -0.1422 -0.0966 -0.2635  -0.1434 -0.0867 -0.2278 
 (0.0873) (0.1027) (0.1496)+  (0.0886) (0.0900) (0.1217)+ 
 [0.0683]** [0.0900] [0.1422]+  [0.0692]+ [0.0804] [0.1161]** 
Notes: All the results are the marginal effects of instrumented credit variable using IV regressions. The regressions include 
child, household, village characteristics and district fixed effects (except the first and fourth columns). ‗Basic control‘ is 
the subset of ‗full control‘ and includes some household and child demographic variables. Standard errors presented in 
parentheses are corrected for clustering at the village level using the formulas in Liang and Zeger (1986), while those in 
brackets are corrected for clustering at the household level. The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by the 
average credit borrowed by the respective group of households. All the estimates are also weighted propensity scores. 
Coefficients with + are significant at the 10%, those with ** at the 5%, and those with * at the 1%. 
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Table 4: Effects of Control Variables on School Enrolment and Child Labour 
 
Control Variables 
School Enrolment Child Labour 
LPM  Probit LPM Probit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age of child 0.257 0.271 -0.096 -0.005 
 (0.023)* (0.022)* (0.018)* (0.014) 
Age of child squared -0.012 -0.013 0.006 0.001 
 (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)** 
Number of younger siblings -0.015 -0.015 0.023 0.014 
 (0.008)+ (0.009)+ (0.006)* (0.003)* 
Number of older sister 0.016 0.018 -0.011 -0.01 
 (0.006)* (0.007)* (0.004)* (0.004)* 
Sex of household head 0.128 0.119 -0.103 -0.071 
 (0.054)** (0.067)+ (0.032)* (0.032)** 
Whether mother is present in the family 0.039 0.019 -0.051 -0.026 
 (0.051) (0.060) (0.042) (0.034) 
Highest education of any member  0.038 0.039 -0.02 -0.013 
 (0.003)* (0.004)* (0.002)* (0.002)* 
Age of household head -0.004 -0.004 0.004 0.002 
 (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* 
Education of household head      
           (0-4 years of schooling) 0.064 0.033 -0.051 -0.017 
 (0.031)** (0.049) (0.025)** (0.030) 
           (5-9 years of schooling) 0.044 0.004 -0.016 0.008 
 (0.024)+ (0.042) (0.017) (0.025) 
Years of mother‘s schooling  -0.002 0.004 0 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
Village Characteristics: 
Presence of primary school -0.02 -0.024 0.008 0.007 
 (0.032) (0.029) (0.025) (0.014) 
Presence of secondary school or college  0.052 0.058 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.019)* (0.018)* (0.014) (0.009) 
Presence of religious school  0.026 0.022 -0.008 -0.002 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.028) (0.018) 
Presence of health facility 0.041 0.04 -0.017 -0.01 
 (0.020)** (0.023)+ (0.018) (0.013) 
Presence of brick-built road 0.066 0.065 -0.048 -0.031 
 (0.027)** (0.027)** (0.017)* (0.011)* 
Presence of grocery market -0.082 -0.09 0.033 0.026 
 (0.021)* (0.025)* (0.012)* (0.010)* 
Presence of bus stand -0.072 -0.072 0.058 0.043 
 (0.031)** (0.042)+ (0.020)* (0.022)+ 
Distance to nearest sub-district (in km) -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Adult male wage -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Rice price 0 0.001 0.006 0.003 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.005) 
Number of observations 4277 4277 4277 4277 
R-squared 0.22  0.23  
Notes: Regressions also include dummies for birth-order, dummies for land-holding, presence of post-office and 
instrumented credit variable. All the coefficient estimates are the marginal effects. Standard errors presented in 
parentheses are corrected for clustering at the village level using the formulas in Liang and Zeger (1986) and using 
the propensity score weighting scheme. Coefficients with + are significant at the 10%, those with ** at the 5%, 
and those with * at the 1%. 
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Table 5: Impact Estimates Based on Binary Participation Measure  
on School Enrolment and Child Labour 
 
  Child is in school  Child is in work 
 LPM Probit  LPM Probit 
Women's Credit     
Boys -0.1690 -0.1878  0.0193 -0.0120 
 (0.1374) (0.1463)  (0.0956) (0.0590) 
 [0.1240] [0.1353]  [0.0879] [0.0567] 
      
Girls -0.4782 -0.4438  0.2569 0.1369 
 (0.1359)* (0.1322)*  (0.0946)* (0.05376)** 
 [0.1309]* [0.1281]*  [0.0944]* [0.05375]** 
Men's Credit      
Boys -0.1190 -0.1634  0.0097 -0.0325 
 (0.1744) (0.1769)  (0.1175) (0.0663) 
 [0.1636] [0.1702]  [0.1176] [0.0679] 
      
Girls -0.5828 -0.5153  0.3019 0.0842 
 (0.1782)* (0.1521)*  (0.1357)** (0.04224)** 
  [0.1800]* [0.1571]*   [0.1313]** [0.03974]** 
 
Notes: All the results are the marginal effects of instrumented binary treatment indicator variable 
using IV regressions. The regressions include full control using child, household, village 
characteristics and district fixed effects. Standard errors presented in parentheses are corrected for 
clustering at the village level using the formulas in Liang and Zeger (1986) and using the propensity 
score weighting scheme. Coefficients with ** are significant at the 5%, and those with * at the 1%. 
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Table 6: Impact Estimates Based on Children’s Age Group 
 
 Child is in school  Child is in work 
 Age 7-12 Age 12-16  Age 7-12 Age 12-16  
Women's credit      
Boys -0.3274 0.1978  0.0491 -0.1784 
 (0.1557)** (0.2952)  (0.0413) (0.2156) 
Girls -0.3295 -0.5991  0.0785 0.2818 
 (0.1507)** (0.2224)*  (0.0401)+ (0.1416)** 
Men's credit      
Boys -0.2329 0.0491  0.0051 -0.1673 
 (0.1612) (0.3816)  (0.0312) (0.2666) 
Girls -0.4131 -0.6178  0.0382 0.1077 
 (0.1877)** (0.7428)  (0.0398) (0.2457) 
 
Notes: All the results are the probit marginal effects of instrumented binary treatment indicator variable using 
IV regressions. The regressions include full control using child, household, village characteristics and district 
fixed effects. Standard errors presented in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the village level using the 
formulas in Liang and Zeger (1986) and using the propensity score weighting scheme. Coefficients with + are 
significant at the 10%, those with ** at the 5%, and those with * at the 1%. 
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Table 7: Impact Estimates Based on Parental Education 
 
  Education of 
Household Head 
  
              Child is in school                Child is in work 
  
All 
children Boys    Girls   
All 
children Boys Girls 
Probit        
 Low  -0.2931 -0.2235 -0.3477  0.0966 0.0220 0.1373 
  (0.0705)* (0.0839)* (0.0878)*  (0.0317)* (0.0410) (0.0346)* 
 Middle  -0.0333 0.0415 -0.0920  0.0319 -0.0783 0.1019 
  (0.0736) (0.0911) (0.1009)  (-0.0338) (-0.0546) (0.0367)* 
 High  0.0472 0.0887 0.0322  -0.0080 -0.1087 0.0649 
  (0.1115) (0.1446) (0.1220)  (0.0470) (0.0730) (0.0472) 
LPM   
 
   
 
 Low  -0.2756 -0.1938 -0.3479  0.1302 0.0471 0.1972 
  (0.0670)* (0.0797)** (0.0854)*  (0.0424)* (0.0526) (0.0524)* 
 Middle  -0.0452 0.0420 -0.1191  0.0617 -0.0653 0.1574 
  (0.0652) (0.0797) (0.0894)  (0.0400) (0.0585) (0.0510)* 
 High  0.0046 0.0668 -0.0454  0.0082 -0.0925 0.1011 
    (0.0914) (0.1223) (0.0936)   (0.0530) (0.0769) (0.0635) 
 
Notes: Low refers to households where the highest level of education obtained by parents is primary (0-4 years of 
schooling) or less; Middle refers to households where the highest level of education obtained by parents is more than 
primary but less than a high school degree (5-10 years of schooling), and High  refers households where one of the parents 
obtained at least a high school degree (11 or more years of schooling). All the results are the marginal effects of 
instrumented credit interacted with education dummies using IV regressions. The regressions include full control using 
child, household, village characteristics and district fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for 
clustering at the village level using the formulas in Liang and Zeger (1986) and using propensity score weighting scheme. 
Coefficients with ** are significant at the 5%, and those with * at the 1%. 
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Table 8: Impact Estimates Based on Land Ownership 
 
  Child is in school  Child is in work 
 LPM Probit  LPM Probit 
Poorer Households      
Boys 0.136 0.115  -0.085 -0.078 
 (0.119) (0.139)  (0.073) (0.044)+ 
      
Girls -0.231 -0.238  0.098 0.089 
 (0.123)+ (0.128)+  (0.098) (0.070) 
Less Poor Households      
Boys -0.331 -0.328  0.260 0.451 
 (0.844) (0.848)  (0.696) (0.476) 
      
Girls 0.017 0.073  -0.007 0.019 
  (0.824) (0.591)  (0.568) (0.057) 
 
Notes: Poorer household are those who own less than a half acre of land and less poor households own more 
than a half acre of land. The regressions include full control using child, household, village characteristics and 
district fixed effects. The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by the average credit borrowed by 
the respective group of households. Standard errors presented in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the 
village level using the formulas in Liang and Zeger (1986) and using propensity score weighting scheme. 
Coefficients with + are significant at the 10%, those with ** at the 5%, and those with * at the 1%. 
 
 
  
44 
 
Table 9: Impact of the Microcredit Program on Children’s School Achievement 
 
    Boys       Girls   
Female 
Borrower 
Grade 
Completion 
Education 
Gap 
Grade-
for-age   
Grade 
Completion 
Education 
Gap 
Grade-
for-age 
Treatment effect -0.196 -0.092 -21.647  -2.953 2.752 -48.393 
 (0.617) (0.611) (12.912)+  (0.738)* (0.696)* (16.089)* 
Control function 0.158 0.143 22.286  2.963 -2.755 49.405 
 (0.624) (0.617) (13.283)+  (0.745)* (0.705)* (16.256)* 
Male Borrower        
Treatment effect -0.423 0.043 -23.727  -3.773 3.39 -72.497 
 (0.846) (0.817) (17.603)  (0.961)* (0.923)* (21.299)* 
Control function 0.327 0.047 25.084  3.537 -3.199 69.099 
  (0.787) (0.765) (16.855)   (0.958)* (0.921)* (21.373)* 
 
Notes: All the results are estimated using the control function method. The regressions include full control using 
child, household, village characteristics and district fixed effects. The coefficients and the standard errors of 
treatment effects are multiplied by the average credit borrowed by male and female borrowers. Standard errors 
presented in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the village level using the formulas in Liang and Zeger 
(1986) and using propensity score weighting scheme. Coefficients with + are significant at the 10%, and those 
with * at the 1%. 
 
 
 
 
  
45 
 
Table 10: Multinomial Logit Model for Children’s Work/School Status  
 
Child Occupation  Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Self-employment activity 2.03 0.266 
 (0.71)* (0.095)* 
Agriculture  -6.48 0.000 
 (1.73)* (0.0000)* 
Day labourer 1.33 0.0000 
 (1.07) (0.001) 
Service-related activity 2.42 0.0000 
 (4.50) (0.0000) 
Enrolled in school  -0.266 
    (0.096)* 
 
Notes: The regressions include full control using child, household, village 
characteristics and district fixed effects. Standard errors presented in 
parentheses are corrected for clustering at the village level using the 
formulas in Liang and Zeger (1986). Coefficients with * are significant at 
the 1%. 
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Figure 1: Proportion of Children in School 
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Figure 1a: Proportion of Boys in School
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Figure 1b: Proportion of Girls in School
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Figure 2: Proportion of Children in Work 
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Figure 2a: Proportion of Boys in Work
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Figure 2b: Proportion of Girls in Work
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Figure 3: Yeas of Microfinance Program in a Village and the Amount of Credit 
Borrowed by Households 
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Notes: Average credit per household in a village is the amount of credit borrowed (in taka) by all 
households divided by the number of participating households in the program village. Number of years 
a MO is available in a village is the period from which microcredit has been first avilable in the 
program village.  
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Figure 4: School Enrolment and Child Labour at Different Levels of Parental 
Education 
 
Note: Low-edu refers to those households where the highest level of education obtained by parents is primary 
(0-4 years of schooling) or less; Mid-edu refers to households where the highest level of education obtained 
by parents is more than primary but less than a high school degree (5-10 years of schooling), and High-edu 
includes households where one of the parents obtained at least a high school degree (11 or more years of 
schooling).   
 
